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INTRODUCTION
With continuing advances in broadband and pervasive media devices (e.g., smartphones and tablets), it is not uncommon to find the storage media in consumer devices to contain Terabytes (TB) of data. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)'s 15 Regional Computer Forensic Laboratories, for example, reported that the average amount of data they processed in 2014 is 22.10 times the amount of data ten years ago, up from 22TB to 5060TB [1] , [2] . The increase in storage capacity has a direct impact on cloud forensics and operational investigations; hence, it is inevitable that big data solutions will become an integral part of cloud forensics [3] .
Due to the nature of cloud-enabled big data storage solutions, identification of forensic artefacts from the cloud hosting environment may be analogous to 'finding a needle in a haystack' [4] . The data could be segregated across multiple servers via virtualization [5] . Due to the lack of physical access to the cloud hosting environment, forensic examiners may need to rely on the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) for preservation of evidence at a lower level of abstraction. This may, however, not be viable due to service level agreements (SLAs) between a CSP and its users [6] - [14] . Even if the location of the data could be identified, traditional practices and approaches to computer forensic investigation are unlikely to be adequate [9] . For example, existing digital forensic practices generally require a bit-by-bit copy of an entire storage media [15] - [17] , which is unrealistic and expensive on a large-scale dataset [12] . It has been demonstrated that it could take more than 9 hours to merely acquire 30GB of data from an Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud environment [18] , [19] . Hence, the time required to acquire a significantly larger dataset could be considerably longer. These challenges are compounded in cross-jurisdictional investigations, which could prohibit the transfer of evidential data due to the lack of cross-nation legislative agreements in place [16] , [20] - [26] . Therefore, it is unsurprising that forensic analysis of cloud service endpoints remains an area of research interest [23] , [27] - [33] .
CloudMe (previously known as 'iCloud') is a Software as a Service (SaaS) cloud model currently owned and operated by Xcerion [34] . The free version of CloudMe offers up to 19 GB storage space (with referral program), and its premium version offers up to 500 GB storage space for individual users and 5 TB for business users [35] . CloudMe users may share contents with each other, as well as other public users, through email, text-messaging, Facebook and Google sharing. There are three modes of sharing in CloudMe, namely: WebShare, WebShare+, and Collaborate. WebShare only permits one-way sharing, where the recipients are not allowed to make changes to the shared folder. WebShare+ allows users to upload files/folders only, while collaborative sharing allows the recipients to add, edit or delete the content, even without the use of CloudMe client application [36] . The service can be accessed using the web User Interface (UI) as an Internet file system or the client applications, which are available for Microsoft Windows, Linux, Mac OSX, Android, iOS, Google TV, Samsung Smart TV, Western Digital TV, Windows Storage Servers, Novell's Dynamic File Services Suite, Novosoft Handy Backup etc. CloudMe is also compatible with third-party software and Internet services, enabling file compression, encryption, document viewing, video and music streaming etc. through the web/client applications [36] .
In this paper, we seek to identify, collect, preserve, and analyze residual artefacts after using CloudMe cloud storage service on a range of end-point devices, as these devices are typically available to forensic investigators. Evidence recovered from these end-point devices could also be used to inform further investigation in a big data environment. The questions we seek to answer in this research are as follows:
1. What residual artefacts remain on the hard drive and physical memory after a user has used CloudMe desktop client application, and web application? 2. Where are such data remnants located on a Windows, Ubuntu, and Mac OS client device? 3. What Cloudme residual artefacts remain on the internal memory, and where are such data remnants located on an Android and iOS client device? The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe related work. Section 3 describes the experiment environment setup. In Section 4, we discuss the traces from the storage media and physical memory dumps of the desktop clients. Section 5 presents the findings from mobile clients and network traffic, respectively. Finally, we conclude the paper and outline potential future research areas in Section 6.
RELATED WORK The National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) defines cloud computing as
[a] model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction" [37] . The key aspects are to provide on-demand self-service, broad network access, resource pooling, rapid edacity, and measured services. There are three cloud computing service models [37] , namely: Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS), and Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS). NIST [37] also defined four deployment models as part of the cloud computing definition, which are public, private, community, and hybrid clouds. The public cloud is owned and operated by a provider organization. Users can subscribe to the service for a fee, based on the storage or bandwidth usage. On the other hand, the private cloud is tailored to a single organization's needs. The cloud infrastructure that is administered by organizations sharing common concerns (e.g., mission, security requirements, policy, and compliance considerations) are called community cloud.
Cloud computing is not without its own unique forensics challenges [39] . Jurisdiction differences, loss of data control, physical inaccessibility of evidences, multi-tenancy, and lack of tools for large scale distributed and virtualized systems are often cited as key cloud forensic challenges [40] - [43] . Other related challenges include diverse range and types of digital media storage, decentralization, and utilization of antiforensic and encryption techniques [42] , [44] , [45] . For example, Fahdi et al. [46] found that the top three cloud forensic challenges according to digital forensic practitioners are volume of data, legal aspect, and time, while the top three challenges raised by digital forensic researchers are time, volume of data, and automation of forensic analysis.
In the review of the 2011 Australian Federal Government's Cybercrime Bill amendment on mutual legal assistance requests, Hooper et al. [24] concluded that laws amendment in a single jurisdiction is unlikely to be adequate in addressing multi-jurisdiction investigation issues, such as in cloud computing environments. Martini and Choo [7] , Taylor et at. [47] , and Daryabar et al. [9] echoed the need for harmonize relevant legislation across jurisdictions, although realistically it is challenging due to the different judicial and legal systems internationally. Simou et al. [42] and Pichan et al. [43] added that our dependence on CSP also compound the challenges in all stages of cloud forensics (e.g., identify, preserve, analyze, and report [48] , [49] ). Therefore, Farina et al. [50] and Damshenas et al. [3] , [11] suggested mitigating such limitations through clearly-defined Service Level Agreements (SLA) between CPSs and users.
Martini and Choo [51] proposed the first cloud forensic investigation framework, which was derived based upon the frameworks of McKemmish [52] and NIST [49] . The framework was used to investigate ownCloud [53] , Amazon EC2 [18] , VMWare [54] , and XtreemFS [55] . Quick et al. [23] extended and validated the four-stage framework using SkyDrive, Dropbox, Google Drive, and ownCloud. Chung et al. [56] proposed a methodology for cloud investigation on Windows, Mac OSX, iOS, and Android devices. The methodology was then used to investigate Amazon S3, Google Docs, and Evernote. Scanlon et al. [57] outlined a methodology for remote acquisition of evidences from decentralized file synchronization networks and utilized it to investigate BitTorrent Sync [58] . In another study, Teing et al. [27] proposed a methodology to investigate the BitTorrent Sync application (version 2.0) or any third party and Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) applications. Do et al. [59] proposed an adversary model for digital forensics and demonstrated how such an adversary model can be used to investigate mobile devices (e.g. Android smartwatch -Do et al. [60] and apps). Ab Rahman et al. [61] proposed a conceptual forensic-bydesign framework to integrate forensics tools and best practices in the design and development of cloud systems.
Marty [62] and Shields et al. [63] proposed a proactive application-level logging mechanism designed to log information of forensics interest. However, Zawoad and Hasan [64] argued that the proposed solutions may not be viable in real world scenarios. Forensic researchers such as Dykstra and Sherman [65] , Gebhardt and Reiser [66] , Quick et al. [23] , and Martini and Choo [54] , on the other hand, presented methods and prototype implementations to support the (remote) collection of evidential materials using Application Programming Interfaces (API). Quick and Choo [67] and Teing et al. [29] studied the integrity of data downloaded from the web and desktop clients of Dropbox, Google Drive, Skydrive, and Symform and determined that the act of downloading files from client applications does not breach the evidence integrity (e.g., no change in the hash values), despite changes in file creation/modification time.
In addition to remote collection of evidences, scholars also studied the potential of on-device collection of cloud artefacts such as from Evernote [56] , Amazon S3 [56] , Dropbox [33] , [56] , Google Drive [31] , [56] , Microsoft Skydrive [32] , Amazon Cloud Drive [68] , BitTorrent Sync [27] , [69] , SugarSync [70] , Ubuntu One [30] , huBic [71] , Mega [72] , Syncany [28] , SpiderOak, JustCloud, pCloud [73] , as well as different mobile cloud apps [20] , [74] . Quick and Choo [31] - [33] also determined that data erasing tools such as Eraser and CCleaner may not completely remove the data remnants from Dropbox, Google Drive, and Microsoft SkyDrive. We are not aware of any published research focusing on forensic investigation of CloudMe SaaS cloud, and this is the gap we aim to contribute to in this research.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
We adopted the research methodology of Quick and Choo [31] - [33] and Teing et al. [16] , [26] - [29] in the design of our experiments. The first step was to set up the test environments for the desktop and mobile clients. The desktop environment consisted of three Virtual Machines (VMs) with following configurations:
  Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5 with 1GB RAM and 60GB hard drive. The VMs were hosted using VMware Fusion Professional version 7.0.0 (2103067) on a Macbook Pro running Mac OS X Mavericks 10.9.5, with a 2.6GHz Intel Core i7 processor and 16GB of RAM. As noted by Quick and Choo [31] - [33] , it would have been laborious to replicate the experimental environment setup on a physical workstation. The client mobile devices comprised a factory restored iPhone 4 running iOS 7.1.2 and an HTC One X running Android KitKat 4.4.4, which were jailbroken/rooted with 'Pangu8 Version 1.1' and 'Odin3 Version 185' (respectively) to enable root access to the user's partition. We then created a set of sample files for the file transfer experiments, which consisted of copies of the 3111 th email message of the Berkeley Enron email dataset (downloaded from http://bailando.sims.berke ley.edu/enron_email.html) that were saved in .RTF, .TXT, .DOCX, .JPG (print screen), .ZIP, and .PDF formats. This provides a basis for replicating the experiment in future.
Similar to previous studies [29] , [32] , [70] , [75] , the fourth step of the methodology involved conducting a predefined set of experiments such as installation and uninstallation of the CloudMe client applications as well as uploading, downloading, viewing, deleting, unsyncing, sharing, and inactivating sync files/folders to simulate various real world scenarios of using the CloudMe desktop, mobile, and web applications. The web application was accessed using the Google Chrome client for Windows version 51.0.2704.103m. Before each experiment, we made a base snapshot of each VM workstation to serve as the control case. After each experiment, we created a snapshot of the VM workstations before taking a copy of the virtual memory and disk file (after system's shutdown) in bit-stream (dd) and Encase Evidence (E01) formats, respectively. It was considered that undertaking analysis on the virtual memory (.VMEM) and disk (.VMDK) file would prevent the memory/image acquisition tools from altering the data in the storage media and physical memory [31]- [33] . As for the mobile clients, we made binary images using 'dd' over SSH/ADB Shell.
In the fifth step, we set up a forensic workstation with the tools in Table I . We then collected data relevant to the CloudMe investigation in the sixth step, before analysing the data in the seventh step. In the former, we extracted data that matched the terms 'cloudme', 'xcerion, and 'Enron3111′ from the forensic images for analysis using the tools of relevance in the latter. These included SQLite database files, PLIST files, prefetch files, event logs, shortcuts, thumbnail cache, $MFT, $LogFile, $UsnJrnl, as well as web browser files (e.g., in %AppData%\Local\Google, %AppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\WebCache, %AppData%\Roaming\M ozilla, %AppData%\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Files\index.dat). The artefacts from the physical memory dump were collected using Volatility, Photorec file carver, and HxD Hex Editor; network traffic using Wireshark and NetMiner. For all the data collected, both MD5 and SHA1 hash values were calculated and subsequently verified. All experiments were repeated thrice (at different dates) to ensure consistency of findings. When the sync folders with the option "When delete folder in the cloud and all its content is selected." in the client applications were deleted, we observed that the sync folders remained locally but were removed completely from the server. In all scenarios, the data and download directories remained after uninstallation of the client applications.
CLOUDME ANALYSIS ON DESKTOP CLIENTS

Cache.db Database
The file synchronization metadata and cloud transaction records could be predominantly located in the /%CloudMe%/cache.db database (in the data directory). The tables of forensic interest are 'user_table', 'syncfolder_table', 'syncfolder_folder_table', and 'syncfolder_document_table'. The 'user_table' holds the property information of users who had logged in from the desktop client applications; 'syncfolder_table' maintains a list of metadata associated with the sync folder(s) added by or download to the local device; 'syncfolder_folder_table' keeps track of the tree structure for the sync folder(s); and 'syncfolder_document_table' records the metadata associated with the synced files in the sync folder(s). Table II .
To construct a meaningful file synchronisation timeline, we threaded the data fields in the four tables to provide the information such as: Which are the synced files? Where are the locations? Who is the owner of the files? What time was the files created? What is the last sync time. Error! Reference source not found. shows the SQL query used to parse Cache.db and produce synchronization history shown in Error! Reference source not found..
CloudMe Registry, Sync.conf, and com.CloudMe.Sync.plist Files
Examination of the Windows registry revealed the username for the currently logged in user and the device name in HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\CloudMe\Sync\startup\me and HKEY_USERS\<SID>\Software\CloudMe\Sync\<Username>\_xClientId (respectively). The username can be a useful identifying information for the cache.db database's remnants i.e., locating copies of the 'user_table' data in physical memory dumps. The client ID is a unique 32-character alphanumeric string used to identify a CloudMe device, which can be used to correlate residual evidences.
In Ubuntu client, both username and clientID were located in the /home/<User Profile>/.config/CloudMe/Sync.conf file, by looking at values for entries 'me' (of the 'startup' property) and '_xClientId' (of the 'Username' property) respectively. In the Mac OSX client, Username and ClientID were located in the 'startup.me' and ' [Username] .xClientId' properties of the /Users/<User Profile>/Library/Preferences/com.CloudMe.Sync.plist file.
Cloudme Log Files
Log files play a vital role in an incident investigation [13] . The CloudMe log files are located in the 'logs' subdirectory and created daily and named as 
Web Browser Artefacts
Web browsing activities history is a critical source of evidence [29] , [31] - [33] , [53] . Our analysis of the web browsing history found unique identifying URLs associated with the user actions. For example, when accessing a sync folder in the CloudMe web application, we observed following URLs: Rebuilding the web browsing caches produced the root directory for the web application at www.cloudme.com/v1. In particular, within the /%v1%/folders directory, we recovered a list of metadata files for the sync folders accessed by the user, which could be differentiated by the folder ID. Error! Reference source not found. illustrates the metadata information associated with the sync folders; each of which creates a 'folder' subtag to house the folder ID and name, and a 'tag' subtag to hold the folder sharing information such as the webshare ID and folder sharing type i.e., in the 'group' property.
A search for the filenames of the sample files recovered files viewed on the web application in cache at /%v1%/documents/<Folder ID>/<Document ID>/1/. We also recovered thumbnails for the viewed files in /%v1%/documents/<Folder ID>/<Document ID>/<Thumbnail ID>. Notice that the /%v1%/documents directory will always contain at least one folder i.e., holding the metadata files associated with the sync devices at /%v1%/documents/<Folder ID>/<Document ID for device-specific metadata file>\1. Error! Reference source not found. shows the recovered device name and client ID from the 'dName' and 'clientId' properties of the 'sync' tag in the metadata file. Each sync folder creates a 'syncfolder' subtag to define the folder name, directory path, folder ID, last sync time, and information about whether the sync folder has been synchronised and if it is a favourite folder in the 'name', path', 'folderId,' lastSync', 'hasSynchronized', and 'favoriteFolder' properties respectively.
Another directory of interest within the 'v1' directory is the user-specific %v1%\users\<User ID> directory, which maintains a list of OpenSearch [72] description documents containing a wealth of folder metadata of forensic interest about the sync folders [73] . For example, the %v1%/users/<User ID>/favorites/extended=true&order=favoritename&count=100 0&offset=0&_=1458191.xml document holds the OpenSearch description for the favourite folders. The metadata of interest recovered from this document include the folder IDs, folder names, folder sharing passwords, webshare IDs, as well as usernames and user IDs for the favourite folders in the 'folder_id', 'name', 'password', 'webShareId', sharingUserId', 'sharingUserName' properties of the sync folder/filespecific 'favorite' subtags (see Error! Reference source not found.). The %v1%/users/<User ID>/webshares/order=name&desc=false&count=1000&offset=0&resources=true&_ =145.xml document defines the OpenSearch property of the shared folders/files, such as the update time, creation time, passwords, creators' IDs, webshare IDs in the 'updated', created', 'password', 'userId', and 'id' properties of the sync folder/file-specific 'webshare' subtags. The folder name and ID could be discerned from the 'name' and 'id' properties of the 'folder' subtag (see Error! Reference source not found.). Further details of the folder/file sharing could be located in the %v1%/users/<User ID>/lifestream document, such as the senders' user ID, senders' group ID, senders' username, receivers' user ID, receivers' group ID, receiver's username, favourite IDs (for favourite folders), and whether the sharing has been seen in the 'senderId', 'senderGroupId', 'senderName', 'receiverId', 'receiverGroupId', 'receiverName', 'parentFolder', and 'seen' properties in the 'event' subtags.
Physical Memory Analysis
For all investigated client applications, analysis of the physical memory dumps using the 'pslist' function of Volatility resulted in the recovery of the process name, process identifier (PID), parent process identifiers (PPID), and process initiation time (which echoed the observation of [16] ). We determined that the CloudMe process could be differentiated using the process names 'CloudMe.exe', 'cloudme-sync' and 'CloudMe' on the Windows, Ubuntu and Mac OS clients, respectively.
Undertaking data carving of the memory image of the CloudMe process determined that the files of forensic interest such as cache.db, sync.config, and CloudMe logs could be recovered. When CloudMe was accessed using the web client, we recovered copies of the OpenSearch description documents containing the folder sharing passwords from the web browser's memory space intact. Unsurprisingly, we also recovered copies of the database, configuration, and log files in plain text. For the cache database, a search for the username for the user located the data [74] of the 'user_table', which holds the user ID in the row ID variant field of the cell header section [74] in hex format. Once the user ID is identified, a practitioner may locate the file offsets contained between the cell data section of the 'syncfolder_document_table', 'syncfolder_folder_table' and 'syncfolder_table' tables, and work backwards to read the header field type varints [74] to recover the remaining data fields.
CLOUDME ANALYSIS ON MOBILE CLIENTS
Our examinations of the CloudMe mobile clients determined that the data directory is located in /private/var/mobile/Applications/<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe iOS app>/ and /data/data/com.excerion.android on the iOS and Android clients. Although the mobile clients did not keep a copy of the sync folders from the user's account (like the desktop clients), it was possible to recover copies of the viewed files from %<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe iOS app>%/Documents/persistentCache/ and /storage/sdcard0/Android/data/com.xcerion.android/cache/files/Downloads/ of the iOS and Android clients by default.
com.xcerion.icloud.iphone.plist and user_data.xml Files
A closer examination of the files in the directory listings located the username and password in plaintext in the 'username' and 'password' properties of the %<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe iOS app>%/Library/Preferences/com.xcerion.icloud.iphone.plist and %com.excerion.android%/shared_prefs/user_data.xml files. The former also held the last upload time in datetime format in the '<username_LastUploadTime>' property.
db.sdb Database
Analysis of the Android client revealed the cache database at /storage/sdcard0/Android/data/com.xcerion.android/cache/db.sdb. The tables of interest with the cache database are 'files' and 'folders'. The 'files' table maintains a list of metadata of the sync files viewed by the user, while the 'folders' table holds the metadata of the sync folders associated with the user's account. db.sdb Database shows the table fields of interest from the db.sdb database. We also proposed using a SQL query to thread the table fields of interest from the tables to present the records in a forensically-friendly format as shown in Error! Reference source not found..
Cache.db Database
Further examination of the iOS client recovered copies of the responses for the web API queries in the %<Universally Unique Identifier (UUID) for the CloudMe iOS app>%/Library/Caches/com. xcerion.icloud.iphone/nsurlcache/Cache.db database. Specifically, we located the cached items in the 'receiver_data ' table column of the cfurl_cache_receiver_data table in Binary Large OBject (BLOB)  including metadata files and OpenSearch documents for the sync folders. Within the cfurl_cache_response  table,  we  located  the  corresponding  URLs  and  timestamps in datetime format, in the "request_key" and "time_stamp" table columns, respectively. By threading the data fields us ing the SQL query "SELECT cfurl_cache_receiver_data.receiver_data, cfurl_cache_response.request_key, cfurl_cache_response.time_stamp FROM cfurl_cache_receiver_data, cfurl_cache_response WHERE cfurl _cache_receiver_data.entry_ID=cfurl_cache_response.entry_ID", it was possible to correlate the cached items with the URLs and timestamps.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we examined the client residual artefacts left by CloudMe SaaS cloud as a backbone for big data storage. Our research included installing the client applications as well as uploading, downloading, deleting, sharing and activating/inactivating the sync folders/files using the client and web applications. We determined that a forensic practitioner investigating CloudMe cloud application should pay attention to the cache database, web caches, and log and configuration files, as highlighted in TABLE IV. Unlike cloud applications such as BitTorrent Sync [27] and Symform [29] , the CloudMe client applications did not create any identifying information (e.g., configuration file and cache folder) in the sync folders; hence, a practitioner cannot identify the sync directories from the directory listing. This also indicates that the cache database is a critical source of evidence for the synchronization metadata and cloud transaction records, and hence should not be overlooked.
Analysis of the mobile clients determined that the findings were not as conclusive in comparison with the desktop clients, and only the viewed files could be recovered. This indicated that the iOS and Android mobile clients are merely a UI for the web application. Our examination of the web browsing activities identified unique URLs that can aid in identification of the user actions made to the web application, such as login, logout, and accessing and downloading sync files/folders. Although the application layer was fully encrypted (using HTTPS), we were able to recover the root directory for the web application from the web browser's caches unencrypted, which included viewed files and metadata files and OpenSearch documents for the sync files/folders that contain the timestamp information and sharing passwords for the sync folders/files. However, a practitioner should note that the availability of the cached items depends on the API requests made to the web application; hence, the artefacts may not be consistent across different occasions.
Our analysis of the physical memory captures revealed that the memory dumps may provide potential for alternative methods for recovering applications cache, logs, configuration files and other files of forensic interest. It was also possible to recover the folder sharing password from the web cache in plain text, but not for the login password. This suggested that a practitioner can only obtain the login password from the mobile clients, using WebBrowserPassView when manually saved in the web browsers, through an offline brute-force technique, or directly from the user. However, it should be emphasized that the data in physical memory may be overwritten on low memory and system's shut down [16] . Therefore, obtaining the memory snapshot as quickly as possible increases the likelihood of preserving the artefacts.
We suggest future work extend this study to other popular and contemporary cloud storage services to provide further understanding of the big data artefacts from different cloud deployment models, which could lay the foundation for the development of data reduction techniques (e.g., data mining and intelligence analysis) for these technologies [79] , [80] . TABLE II  TABLES AND TABLE COLUMNS OF FORENSIC INTERESTS FROM CACHE.DB  Table  Table Column Folder's name for the parent folder.
Is_root
Whether the sync folder is a root folder? Path
Original directory path for the sync folder. 
